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Abstract 
Since independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has pursued a gradual approach to the transition from planned to 
market  economy.  This  approach  relied  heavily  on  trade  controls,  directed  credit,  and  large  public 
investments. In addition, a number of financial sector measures were instituted that distorted resource 
allocation and increased transaction costs. As a result, while possibly preventing the contraction of output 
in the early 1990s, these policies led to disappointing economic outcomes and social conditions later on. 
The  paper  reviews  the  underlying  distortions  and  presents  survey-based  evidence  to  support  their 
existence  and  their  detrimental  impact  on  economic  activity.  Looking  forward,  the  paper—using  a 
representative  agent  framework  to  model  existing  financial  sector  distortions—offers  some  guidance 
regarding the likely implications of eliminating these distortions on key aggregate variables. It suggests 
that  the  elimination  of  these  distortions  will  be  welfare  enhancing  and  will  lead  to  higher  levels  of 
investment and capital stock. 
JEL Classification: E50, P23, P27 
Keywords: financial sector distortions, transition, Uzbekistan 
1.  Introduction 
Uzbekistan  is  strategically  located  in  Central  Asia,  at  the  crossroads  of  the 
ancient  Silk  Road  between  China  and  Europe.  Of  the  15  independent  states  that 
emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan is the third largest 
in population (about 26 million) and the fourth largest in land area (448 thousand square 
kilometers). During the Soviet period, Uzbekistan was developed as a leading center for 
cotton production, capitalizing on its vast water resources for irrigation.  
Since independence, the Uzbek authorities have opted for a gradual approach to 
reforming their economy. Their strategy aimed at building a socially oriented market 
economy,  and  developing  industrial  and  manufacturing  capacity  in  a  predominantly 
agricultural  economy  using  substantial  and  direct  central  guidance. To  that  end,  the 
government has adopted an import-substitution strategy, particularly since 1997, that 
has relied heavily on administrative intervention and a restrictive foreign exchange and 
trade regime. 
Unfortunately, this gradual reform strategy relied heavily on three interventionist 
pillars, most of which have their roots in Soviet planned-economic practices: exchange 
and trade controls, directed resource allocation, output targets (especially agricultural) 
and sizable public investment. Some of these controls and restrictions, discussed in 
detail in the paper, are quite unique. As a result, while these policies may have prevented 
output from contracting in the early 1990s, they led to disappointing economic and 
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social conditions later on.
2 Industrial growth was very low and uneven. While some new 
industries were promoted, many others have ceased operations or are operating below 
capacity.  Production  and  exports  witnessed  little  diversification.  The  government’s 
presence remains strong in many areas, with governance and capacity issues providing 
reasons  for  concern  to  the  international  community.
3  Furthermore,  the  opacity  and 
unpredictability of government policies continue to hinder domestic economic activity 
(IFC, 2004) and foreign investment. Uzbekistan lags behind most transition economies 
in terms of market development, large-scale privatization, and corporate governance.  
Zettelmeyer (1998) found that Uzbekistan’s good output performance during 
the early 1990s was mainly due to a combination of low initial industrialization, (scale 
of) cotton production, and self-sufficiency in energy. These three elements more than 
offset the impact of the government’s poor macroeconomic and structural policies. This 
conclusion  that  the  government’s  public  investment  and  gradualist  reform  program 
were not the driving forces behind the relatively favorable output performance is also 
repeated in Taube and Zettelmeyer (1998). 
The government’s interventionist and distortionary policies were also reflected 
in  the  financial  sector—dominated  by  state-owned  banks—and  in  monetary  and 
exchange rate policies. The legacy of administratively-determined interest and exchange 
rates and limits to access to cash resulted in deteriorating confidence in the financial 
system. This is reflected in the low level of monetization and heavy reliance of the 
banking sector on foreign loans as a liability base.
4 Ranaweeva (2003) shows that the 
disequilibria  in  the  product  and  money  markets—in  an  environment  of  multiple 
exchange rates, administrative controls, and import restrictions—were the major forces 
driving  inflation  dynamics  in  Uzbekistan.  In  turn,  Rosenberg  and  de  Zeeuw  (2000) 
found that Uzbekistan’s multiple exchange rate regime transferred about 16 percent of 
GDP from exporters to importers and generated identifiable welfare losses in the range 
of 2–8 percent of GDP on import markets and up to 15 percent on export markets. 
However, the government has addressed some of these problems since 2000. It 
has  successively  reduced  exchange  market  distortions  and  introduced  currency 
convertibility, tightened fiscal and monetary policies, initiated the restructuring of farms 
into leaseholds, and followed a more conservative borrowing path. It has also taken 
steps to improve the business environment, including the introduction of a unified tax, 
streamlined  registration  procedures,  fewer  business  inspections,  and  relaxed  foreign 
                                                 
2 After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan recorded the smallest output decline among all the 
CIS  countries  and  was  the  first  country  to  resume  growth.  This,  however,  did  not  translate  into 
improvements in living standards and poverty remained high. Berengaut and Elborgh-Woytek (2005) and 
Pomfret  (2003)  are  useful  references  for  placing  Uzbekistan’s  institutional,  social,  and  output 
developments in the context of those in other transition countries. 
3 While the discussion of governance, democracy, and human rights dimension is outside of the scope of 
this paper, a few points could be of relevance here. The Economist Intelligence Unit has recently ranked 
Uzbekistan  160th  out  of  167  countries  worldwide  in  terms  of  democracy  (EIU,  2006),  with  the 
Transparency  International  ranking  the  country  143rd  out  of  159  countries  in  terms  of  corruption 
perception (TI, 2006). While generally stable, the political environment is tense, with social discontent, 
stemming from widespread poverty and excessive government interventions, having taken the form of 
riots in the past. The first parliamentary elections, which took place in December 2004, were seen by 
observers as neither free nor fair and the opposition parties were barred from participating in it. 
4 In 2004, foreign loans constituted approximately 53 percent of the banking sector’s total liabilities, or 2.5 
times its capital base.  
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exchange surrender requirements for exports.
5 On the financial sector side, in 2004 and 
early 2005, the government implemented new measures and introduced legislation—
including  two  presidential  decrees—aimed  at  liberalizing  and  further  reforming  the 
sector.  Most  notably,  these  measures  included  the  relaxation  and  reported  complete 
removal  of  cash  constraints  and  the  clearance  of  all  wage  and  pension  arrears  (see 
Appendix  III).  If  implemented  credibly  and  permanently,  and  in  combination  with 
macroeconomic  stability,  these  structural  measures  could  help  Uzbekistan  achieve 
sustained higher growth in the years ahead.  
This  paper  reviews  the  recent  developments  and  underlying  distortions  in 
monetary  and  financial  policies  in  Uzbekistan,  most  notably  cash  shortages  and 
convertibility  problems.  It  describes  the  implications  of  these  distortions  on  the 
behavior of agents and the aggregate economic activity in Uzbekistan. Looking forward, 
the  paper  offers  some  guidance  regarding  the  likely  implications  of  eliminating  the 
observed distortions on key aggregate variables. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of observed 
irregularities, while presenting the official rationale behind keeping in place the policies 
responsible  for  these  irregularities.  Section  III  discusses  how  the  behavior  and 
incentives of agents—consumers, enterprises, and financial intermediaries—change in 
response to these distortions and provides the rationale behind this paper’s modeling of 
the Uzbek economy. The discussion in Sections II and III draws upon a population 
survey conducted jointly by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 
summer  2005—within  the  framework  of  their  surveillance  of  economic  policies  in 
Uzbekistan—to help reveal the extent and implications of financial sector distortions in 
Uzbekistan. (Appendix I provides a snapshot of relevant survey outcomes). Section IV, 
in  turn,  outlines  (based  on  the  predictions  of  a  representative  agent  model)  the 
implications  that  permanently  lifting  the  observed  restrictions  would  likely  have  on 
aggregate output, domestic consumption, trade, and welfare. Finally, Section V offers 
some policy recommendations. 
2.  Description of Prevailing Distortions 
a)  Cash Shortages 
During the past two years, following the liberalization of the exchange rate (see 
below),  Uzbekistan  has  substantially  tightened  policies  aimed  at  restricting  cash  in 
circulation. The government’s motivation behind these policies is to control inflation, 
curb  the  shadow  economy,  narrow  the  gap  between  the  official  and  black  market 
exchange rates, and strengthen tax collection. In the government’s view, what drives 
inflation is the amount of cash in circulation (and not broader monetary aggregates), 
hence the desire to limit availability of cash to curb inflationary pressures.
6 
Commercial banks’ limited access to their correspondent accounts at the Central 
Bank  of  Uzbekistan  (CBU)  is  the  main  element  of  the  policy  to  restrict  cash  in 
                                                 
5  Barriers  to  doing  business,  however,  remained  sizable,  with  reports  of  serious  harassment  and 
persecutions of entrepreneurs surfacing until riots broke out in Kokand in 2004.  
6 Not surprisingly, these policies were not successful in bringing inflation down. Despite extensive cash 
restrictions, Consumer Price Index increased by an estimated 18.8 percent in 2005 (following an increase 
of 15.5 percent in 2004), while the Producer Price Index and GDP deflator grew by 28.2 and 16 percent, 
respectively.  
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circulation.  Banks  are  routinely  unable  to  withdraw  cash  from  their  correspondent 
accounts at the CBU despite having sufficient balances in their accounts. This in turn 
limits their ability to meet their customers’ legitimate requests to withdraw deposits.
7 In 
addition, bank customers—individuals and businesses—are restricted in their ability to 
pay for current expenditures, due to the lack of non-cash-transacting retail outlets (see 
below),  and  to  pay  for  their  inputs  (including  labor),  respectively.  The  situation  is 
exacerbated by the fact that legal entities and individuals engaged in retail trade are 
required to deposit all daily cash receipts above a small threshold on a daily basis to their 
bank through a special cash collection service. These problems have been aggravated by 
related arrears on pensions and civil service wages, which have also been the result of 
attempts to limit cash in circulation.
8  
Direct  evidence  of  cash  shortages  is  reported  by  a  wide  range  of  market 
participants and non-governmental entities and individuals. Figures A-1 and A-2 depict 
the extent and the frequency of problems experienced by individuals while attempting 
to  access  their  cash  in  banks.  While  in  capital  city  of  Tashkent  the  percentage  of 
respondents  with  difficult  or  no  access  to  their  cash  is  66  percent,  in  other  cities 
included in the survey that share is between 80–85 percent. In addition, more than half 
of respondents in all four cities report that they face cash withdrawal limits of 50,000 
sum 
9 (approximately $50). Indirect evidence of these restrictions is found in the premia 
charged  for  non-cash  payments  over  cash  transactions.  (Figure  A-3  shows  the 
distribution of premia paid by respondents for non-cash transactions). 
b)  Convertibility Problems 
Uzbekistan’s acceptance of the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles 
of  Agreement  in  October  2003  was  a  major  step  toward  liberalizing  the  foreign 
exchange market. Businesses in general have since had access to foreign exchange for all 
current  account  transactions,  in  most  cases  without  major  restrictions  or  delays. 
However, despite the CBU’s commitment to currency convertibility, some problems still 
exist. 
These  problems  are  largely  twofold.  First,  enterprises  reportedly  have  some 
difficulties  converting  sums  into  foreign  exchange,  since  the  CBU  makes  foreign 
exchange available for the purchase of consumer goods only during the first few days of 
each month. Any outstanding applications for conversion after this initial period are 
held until the next month. Second, the conversion for some goods faces longer delays 
than others. 
10 Some reports also indicate that the authorities are prohibiting conversion 
to  finance  pre-payment  for  some  imports.  The  CBU  denies  that  convertibility 
restrictions exist, despite confirmation from local and international businessmen, private 
bankers, and diplomats. 
11 
Households too appear to experience difficulties converting foreign exchange 
into sums and vice versa (Figure A-4): 38 percent of the respondents were not able to 
                                                 
7 While this practice is common in Uzbekistan, it is highly unlikely that in any other country a bank which 
is unable to service its depositors would remain open. 
8 Table A-2 states that wage and pension arrears are the most severe problem experienced by respondents. 
9 Sum (pronounced “soum”) is Uzbekistan’s national currency. 
10 The authorities deny the existence of a policy to delay conversion but suggest that some delays happen 
for purely technical reasons. 
11 If these restrictions were to be confirmed, this would constitute a breach of Article VIII of the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement.  
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exchange dollars into sums on their first attempt. This may partially be explained by the 
fact that there are typically long lines in front of exchange bureaus, as reported in Figure 
A-5.  While  exchanging  sums  into  foreign  exchange  appears  to  be  problematic  due 
mainly to convertibility issues (stemming from the CBU’s foreign reserve accumulation 
targets, see below), reverse transactions (i.e., conversion of foreign exchange into sums) 
are typically turned down because of the lack of cash sums in exchange bureaus.     
c)  Other Distortions 
Distinction  between  cash  and  non-cash  transactions:  Uzbekistan’s  Civil 
Code requires that all transactions between enterprises and/or individual entrepreneurs 
must be settled in non-cash form, thus suggesting that cash and non-cash payments are 
not substitutes. While the authorities argue that the reasons for such a requirement are 
to  combat  shadow  economic  activity,  prevent  money  laundering,  and  enhance  tax 
collection,  the  business  community  unanimously  complains  that  these  distinctions 
impede normal economic activity.
12 
Debit cards (or “plastic cards”): During the second half of 2004, the Uzbek 
authorities  took  major  steps  to  encourage  the  use  of  plastic  cards  for  payments 
throughout the country. In particular, a Council of Ministers decree 
13 was issued that 
required banks to establish plastic card payment terminals in retail establishments in 
Tashkent. All such establishments above a certain threshold were being mandated to 
install these terminals at their own expense.
14 While the use of such electronic payment 
mechanisms is desirable, the voluntary nature of such a move is of great importance, as 
it is the only way to encourage the development of a market-oriented banking system. 
This process requires payment infrastructure, which is still being developed and is not 
available on a wide scale.
15 In addition, these cards are seen by the general population as 
another attempt to remove cash from circulation.
16 
Surrender  requirements:  Current  regulations  impose  a  100  percent  foreign 
exchange surrender requirement on centralized exports of cotton and gold, and a 50 
percent surrender requirement—with some exemptions mainly for small and medium 
enterprises—on non-centralized exports. In addition, reports indicate that the interbank 
sales of foreign currencies are prohibited.
17  
Other restrictions: To limit the available liquidity in the financial system and 
monitor cash flows, the CBU requires all retail businesses to have bank accounts and 
                                                 
12 Anecdotal evidence offers some insight into the nonsensical nature of the distinction between cash and 
non-cash payments. For example when a business owner invites a client to a restaurant for dinner, this 
process  would  apparently  require  that  a  contract  be  signed  between  the  business  owner  and  the 
restaurant, prior to the dinner, for the money to be transferred from the business owner’s account to the 
restaurant’s account. Of course, if the restaurant bill exceeds the expected amount, a new contract would 
have to be signed! 
13 Council of Ministers Decree No 445 of September 24, 2004. 
14 In addition, the government had an initial plan to make it obligatory for employers to channel initially a 
small share of wages into plastic card accounts. However, these plans were abandoned in December 2004, 
after recognizing the need for additional infrastructure. 
15 The use of debit cards is extremely limited in Uzbekistan, since only a handful of retail outlets in central 
urban locations carry ATM/plastic card terminals to enable non-cash payments. In addition, due to the 
fact that deposits in plastic card accounts are highly illiquid, they are not popular among consumers. 
16 The illiquidity of plastic card money is also reflected in the way CBU classifies them as part of “other 
deposits”, which are neither part of M1 nor M2. 
17 The CBU denied these restrictions, and has issued a circular to commercial banks clarifying their rights 
in this area.  
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deposit their cash earnings on a daily basis. Balances on these deposits then become 
subject to the cash withdrawal controls described above. As a result, businesses are 
unable to meet their operating expenses given their inability to withdraw cash from their 
bank accounts. 
3.  Implications For Economic Behavior 
The policies of restricting cash in circulation, limiting conversion, and applying 
other distortionary measures have clearly been damaging for economic activity and have 
led to welfare losses. Below, we review the impact of these restrictions on economic 
activity, by type of distortion and by economic agents. 
a)  Cash Shortages 
Households: As indicated above, cash shortages led to wide-spread wage and 
pension  arrears  throughout  much  of  2004.
18  These  shortages  have  also  lead  to  a 
substantial  decline  in velocity  of  broad  money  by  about  22  percent  throughout  the 
year,
19 as customers hoarded the cash they managed to get, as a precautionary measure 
in an environment of ever-tightening cash limits, while accumulating deposits that were 
not  liquid.  Evidence  of  this—as  well  as  of  some  individual  consumers  and  small 
businesses resorting to barter transactions as a result of cash shortages—is reported in 
Figure A-6. Many view cash shortages also as a root cause of wage and pension arrears, 
as reported in Figure A-7. The fact that for a large number of employees salaries are 
directly deposited to their bank accounts further exacerbates the impact of problems 
accessing cash (Figure A-8). 
Enterprises: The extensive restrictions on financial intermediation continue to 
contribute to the difficult business environment, and provide further opportunities and 
justifications for expanding the shadow economy and encouraging rent seeking. Because 
of  cash  shortages,  enterprises  were  frequently  unable  to  pay  for  their  current 
expenditures on time.
20 In addition to increasing the transaction cost for already existing 
enterprises, cash shortages are likely to serve as a major deterrent for the emergence of 
new  small  and  medium  enterprises,  which—by  virtue  of  their  restricted  access  to 
finance—rely more heavily on the timeliness of current transactions.
21 The restrictions 
on access to cash, combined with the mandatory daily deposit of cash receipts, are likely 
to force businesses to operate in the shadow economy as the only way to get cash sums. 
Finally,  it  is  likely  that  cash  restrictions  are  hurting  enterprises  through  reduced 
employee productivity resulting from delays in wage (and pension) payments. A World 
Bank study of the cotton market, Guadagni et al. (2005), states that “one of the reasons 
of the exceptional yields of the 2004 campaign was the increased cash payment for 
harvesting” and as an incentive-enhancing measure proposes the introduction of a 10 
percent cash payment for delivering cotton to the ginneries. 
Financial  intermediaries:  Cash  restrictions  have  resulted  in  an  erosion  of 
confidence in the banking system, as individuals and businesses have been unable to 
                                                 
18 It is important to note that this took place while the government continued to build up deposits at the 
CBU. 
19 Velocity declined by additional 18 percent in 2005. 
20 This happened despite the government’s giving civil service wage and pension payments a priority, 
along with wage payments to key state-owned enterprises. 
21 Securing enough cash to pay wages (by making frequent trips to banks) adds to administrative and labor 
costs, which private sector participants claim are sizable.  
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access their deposit accounts, as a result of commercial banks’ inability to access their 
correspondent accounts at the CBU. As a result, trust in the banking sector remains very 
low, undermining the financial intermediary role of banks.
22 This has led banks—in their 
quest for new deposits—to offer high interest rates, which is likely to undermine their 
profitability and increase their risk profile.
23  
b)  Convertibility Problems 
Households:  Currency  convertibility  for  the  households  has  tremendously 
improved  since  Uzbekistan’s  acceptance  of  Article  VIII.  Although  there  are  some 
difficulties, as mentioned above, this segment of the population usually has access to 
foreign exchange through exchange bureaus.
24 However, the  major problem consumers 
face is limited access to sums—given the existing cash constraints—in order to buy 
foreign exchange. The reasons given to respondents for problems converting sums into 
dollars and visa versa are largely similar and frequently cite the lack of the opposite 
currency to make the exchange, computer problems, and limits on the amount that can 
be converted (Figures A-9 and A-10).
25 As a result, many entrepreneurs resort to the 
services of the black market, with about 46 percent of them using the black market at 
least occasionally, while 11 percent deal with the black market exclusively (Figure A-11). 
Furthermore, convertibility restrictions are likely to limit consumers’ ability to have a 
larger variety (and at times also better quality) of goods available for purchase. 
Enterprises: Convertibility restrictions are aimed at limiting enterprises’ ability 
to import some consumer goods. The authorities’ reasoning behind these restrictions 
seems to be geared toward the protection of local industry, but indications are that the 
restrictions  are  tied  with  the  authorities’  targets  for  foreign  reserve  accumulation, 
protecting the latter against claims to import “unproductive” goods. While explicitly or 
implicitly protecting a few local producers from foreign competition, these restrictions 
will likely have adverse effects on a wide range of other producers and sectors in the 
economy through increasing the cost and reducing the availability of imported inputs. 
Coupled  with  an  otherwise  restrictive  trade  regime  (with  high  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers  in  place),  these  protectionist  measures  are  also  likely  to  hurt  export 
performance.
26 Section IV below highlights an opposite impact of convertibility limits 
on domestic production and consumption. 
Financial intermediaries: Limits on convertibility and on the ability of banks 
to  sell  foreign  exchange  through  the  interbank  market  has  significantly  slowed  the 
establishment of an inter-bank foreign exchange market. If these restrictions continue to 
                                                 
22 While the ratio of broad money to GDP has rebounded to about 15 percent in 2005 from 10 percent in 
2003, it is still one of the lowest among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
23 Following the Presidential Decree No.147 of August 5, 2005, the CBU has announced that banks 
would be granted full access to their correspondent accounts and all legal restrictions on cash transactions 
would be abolished. This resulted in a significant improvement with cash availability, with no recent 
reports  on  wage  and  pension  arrears  and  shortages  of  cash  in  exchange  bureaus.  However,  the 
commercial banks’ access to their correspondent accounts in CBU is not yet fully liberalized. In many 
instances, banks still rely on cash foreign exchange operations in exchange bureaus (as opposed to their 
accounts at the CBU) for cash sums. 
24 During 2005, exchange bureaus purchased $448 million from and sold $1,014 million to households. 
25 The average limit of the amount to be exchanged from dollars into sums was quoted by respondents to 
be $224, while that for the amount to be exchanged from sums into dollars was $300. 
26  See  Tokarick  (2006),  who  estimates  export  loses  as  a  result  of  import  restrictions  in  a  sample  of 
developing countries.  
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remain in place, they will further undermine confidence in the banking sector, reducing 
the  ability  of  banks  to  effectively  service  their  customers,  and  delaying  economic 
recovery.
27 
c)  Other Distortions 
Households: The role of banks in tax collection and financial oversight, against 
principles of confidentiality and secrecy, discourages households from using banking 
services. With respect to plastic cards—which in many countries are an important part 
of the payment infrastructure—success in Uzbekistan will depend on the timing of their 
introduction  and  on  consumers’  ability  to  use  them  voluntarily.  If  introduced 
prematurely, consumers would have great difficulty paying for routine expenses. 
Enterprises:  Instead  of  discouraging  shadow  market  activity,  the  numerous 
market distortions have encouraged legitimate businesses to engage in shadow activities. 
These  distorted  practices  have  placed  an  onerous  and  unnecessary  burden  on 
businesses,  and  have  contributed  to  an  increase  in  transaction  costs.  Most  retail 
establishments—particularly non-state-owned retail establishments—are not equipped 
to accept payments via debit cards, and therefore would be deprived of a large chunk of 
their daily legitimate business should the use of these cards be made mandatory.  
Financial intermediaries: The observed distortions affect the role of financial 
intermediaries in many ways, mainly by weakening confidence in the banking system. 
This works through the following channels. First, the distinction between cash and non-
cash  payments  sends  a  strong  message  that  cash  and  non-cash  payments  are  not 
substitutes, which undermines confidence in the sum as a unit of exchange. Second, the 
continuing  surrender  requirement  in  the  presence  of  comfortable  foreign  exchange 
reserves at the CBU sends a mixed signal about the true intentions of the authorities in 
terms of allowing full convertibility, and thus reduces the demand for sums as a store of 
value.  Finally,  tax  and  financial  control  functions  performed  by  banks  discourages 
individuals and businesses from dealing with the sector.
28 
4.  Implications for the Uzbek Economy 
Based  on  the  findings  of  the  model  described  in  the Appendix,  this  section 
outlines the likely implications of cash and convertibility restrictions—as well as their 
abolishment—on  aggregate  output,  consumption  behavior,  trade,  and  welfare.  The 
model used in the paper builds on a cash-in-advance framework (originated by Clower, 
1967),  but  introduces  additional  elements  to  reflect  the  financial  sector  restrictions 
discussed  above.
29  While  cash-in-advance  constraints  have  been  commonly  used  in 
macroeconomic  modeling  to  justify  the  role  of  money,  in  this  model  the  cash-in-
advance framework is also used to reflect the government’s desire to control cash in 
circulation  through  (i)  the  CBU’s  control  of  banks’  access  to  their  correspondent 
                                                 
27 Evidence of low confidence in the banking system can be found in Table A-2, where lack of trust and 
inability to withdraw cash were both ranked highly on the list of the most pressing concerns expressed by 
the respondents.   
28 Banks are required by law to submit to tax and law enforcement authorities information about their 
customers’ bank accounts and transactions. Taxes can then be levied on these transactions and taken out 
of the account, forcing banks to perform fiscal functions for the government. 
29 The paper introduces a convertibility constraint, which applies to imports of both consumption and 
capital goods. This latter element follows Stockman (1981), who allows the cash-in-advance constraint to 
also apply to purchases/accumulation of capital goods.   
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accounts, (ii) the inability of individuals to withdraw cash from their deposits to finance 
current expenditures, and (iii) the wage and pension arrears generated as a result of cash 
shortages.  The  role  of  cash  and  cash-in-advance  constraints  in  this  setting  are  also 
reinforced  by  the  limited  access  to  consumer  credit  in  Uzbekistan  for  current 
transactions.   
The results of the analytical model would only reflect the direct impacts of the 
observed restrictions on economic activity. While it is likely that cash restrictions (which 
are reflected in wage and pension arrears) would reduce the incentives to work and thus 
labor  productivity, capturing  this  indirect  effect would  have  unduly  complicated  the 
model. Not modeled in this framework is the indirect confidence-reducing impact of 
these  restrictions,  that  would  affect  financial  intermediation,  cost  and  availability  of 
finance, and eventually output. 
a)  The Model 
This section contains the analytical foundations behind economic implications 
of cash and convertibility restrictions and proposed policy prescriptions. It is based on a 
representative agent model that aims to capture the distortions present in the Uzbek 
economy. The intention is to obtain the responses of key variables of interest (e.g., 
aggregate  output,  consumption,  and  trade)  with  respect  to  tightness  of  the  cash-in-
advance and convertibility constraints. The details of the derivations (of the steady-state 
solutions of the model) are contained in Appendix II. 
A representative agent maximizes her utility function, 
30  
 
∫
¥
- ×
0
) , ( dt e g h u
t r                 (1) 
  
subject to the following constraints: 
 
d k em c a + + + =
*       Definition of assets      (2) 
 
rd c eg h k f a + - - - =
·
p ) (     Asset accumulation constraint   (3) 
 
) ( eg h c + ³a        Cash-in-advance constraint    (4) 
 
) (
·
* + ³ k eg em b       Convertibility constraint    (5)  
 
  m d c = +    where  m =
·
m     Money market condition    (6) 
 
where  h and  g  are the consumption of domestically produced and imported 
goods, respectively; 
* m is the amount of foreign exchange holdings; k stands for capital 
goods (which are assumed to be imported); ) (× f a decreasing-returns-to-scale production 
function;  p is  the  rate  of  inflation;  e  is  the  exchange  rate  which  is  assumed  fixed 
                                                 
30 The time subscripts are dropped for expositional simplicity.  
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throughout;
31  cis  cash  in  circulation,d stands  for  deposits,  m is  the  money  supply 
(where  0 ) 0 ( m m = , which jointly with  m =
·
m  indicate that the path of money supply is 
fully  specified),  and  r is  the  real  rate  of  interest.  We  assume  —  for  simplicity  and 
without  loss  of  generality  —  that  capital  does  not  depreciate.  Here,  parameters 
a andb can  be  interpreted  as  the  length  of  time  money  must  be  held  to  finance 
consumption  and  secure  conversion,  respectively  (see  Feenstra,  1985).  Thus,  higher 
values  for  a andb   mean  stricter  cash  and  convertibility  restrictions.  Thus,  the 
government controls the rate of money growth m (by issuing domestic credit) as well as 
a andb  (by creating wage/pension arrears and hurdles for conversion, respectively). 
 
Assuming that both (4) and (5) are binding, we replace them with equalities. 
Substituting those into (2) yields: 
 
) ) ( (
1
d k eg h a k - - + - - =
·
b a a
b
            (7) 
 
Also, substituting (4) into (3) yields: 
 
rd eg h k f a + + - + - =
·
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ap ap           (8) 
 
The  corresponding  first  order  conditions  for  the  maximization  of  (1)  with 
respect to (7) and (8) are as follows: 
32 
 
0 ) 1 ( = + - - q ap l
b
a
h u               (9) 
 
0 ) 1 (
) (
= + -
+
- q ap l
b
b a
e
e
ug             (10) 
 
                                                 
31 Given the policymakers’ drive for reserve accumulation and competitiveness concerns, on the one 
hand,  and the ability to control the demand for imports through altering conversion restrictions (and 
through  that  controlling  any  potential  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate),  on  the  other  hand,  the 
assumption of fixed exchange rate is not too implausible in this set-up.  
32 The underlying Hamiltonian is:  
) ) ( (
1
) , ( , , , , , d k eg h a g h u k a d g h H - - + - - + = b a a
b
l q l  
            ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( rd eg h k f + + - + - + ap ap q  
 
wherel and  q   are  the  shadow  values  for  capital  and  assets,  respectively.  Strictly  speaking,  if  both 
conditions (4) and (5) are binding, because cand m  have pre-determined paths and capital accumulation 
is restricted by equation 5,  d is no longer a choice variable. Instead it acts as a residual between money 
supply and cash in circulation. In practice, this relationship is ensured by the authorities in Uzbekistan 
through the cash surrender requirements described above: by collecting cash from all retailers at the end 
of the day, on the next day the authorities inject back the amount of cash which is consistent with their 
path for cash in circulation, and force the agents to keep their funds in the form of deposits.   
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0 = + - q
b
l
r                  (11) 
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H
× - + =
¶
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q
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l
rl rl l             (12) 
 
b
l
rq rq q - =
¶
¶
- =
·
a
H
              (13) 
 
The steady state solution drawn in (a, k) space would be a saddle path (denoted 1 
below). 
 
Figure 1. The Steady State Path 
 
 
Without going though the derivation of the steady state relationships between 
key variables key variables (which is discussed in Appendix II), we move on to the main 
results stemming from the model. 
b)  Findings 
The  findings  of  the  analysis  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  First  of  all,  the 
optimal steady-state capital stock appears to be a decreasing function of convertibility 
restrictions. Thus, the steady-state capital stock, investment, and output would likely 
increase if convertibility requirements are relaxed. Availability of more foreign currency 
for conversion would result in more imports of capital and intermediate goods and, 
subsequently, more investment and output. 
Second,  tightening  of  cash  restrictions  has  a  dampening  effect  on  domestic 
consumption.  However,  the  impact  of  convertibility  constraints  on  domestic  
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consumption is ambiguous. While the restrictions on convertibility (and, therefore, on 
imports of foreign goods) have a direct impact of encouraging domestic consumption 
(since domestic and foreign goods are assumed to be substitutes), the indirect effect 
through production will have the opposite effect on domestic consumption. The net 
effect will depend on the parameters of the production function and the degree of 
substitutability between domestic and imported consumption. 
Third, the impact of both types of restrictions on imported consumption goods 
is negative. 
Fourth,  the  convertibility  restrictions  encourage  deposit  accumulation  (since 
fewer dollars are made available to finance imports, and therefore fewer sums would be 
exchanged  ceteris  paribus).  In  contrast,  the  limits  on  cash  are  likely  to  reduce  the 
amount of deposits. This can be seen as a result of consumers being forced to hold 
more cash (and less money in deposits) in response to tightening requirements.
33 This 
constitutes a clear wedge between the authorities’ policy intentions (of reducing cash in 
circulation) and the actual outcome (of increased cash holdings) as a result of tighter 
cash restrictions. This is reflected in the growth of the share of cash (in broad money) 
held outside of banks, which has increased substantially in recent years.
34 
Fifth,  cash  shortages  have  an  unambiguous  negative  impact  on  consumers’ 
utility/welfare, through the reduction of both components of consumption. While as 
mentioned above, the impact of convertibility on domestic consumption is ambiguous, 
the (utility obtained from the) reduction in consumption of foreign goods is larger than 
any potential increase in (the utility obtained from) domestic consumption. Hence, the 
unambiguous welfare-reducing implication of convertibility limits. 
Finally, despite the dampening impact of both types of restrictions on imports, 
they have different impacts on the current account. Since there is no (direct) impact 
from cash restrictions on output (and therefore exports) in the model, the impact on the 
current account would be through the impact on imports. The limits on convertibility, 
however, have an impact on aggregate production and exports, in addition to reducing 
imports, and therefore have an ambiguous impact on the current account. 
5.  Policy Prescriptions 
To encourage financial sector reforms, and through that enhance the economy’s 
growth potential, the authorities in Uzbekistan would be well advised to revise their 
views and policies, specifically pertaining to the relationships between (i) inflation and 
cash  in  circulation,  (ii)  restrictions  on  cash  and  shadow  economic  activity,  and  (iii) 
import (including convertibility) restrictions and aggregate welfare.  
Regarding inflation control, the CBU should target appropriate growth in money 
supply, while allowing the market to determine the shares of cash and deposits. As 
demonstrated by the simple modeling exercise above, eliminating the cash restrictions is 
unambiguously welfare-enhancing and the authorities should take measures to reduce 
cash shortages and the resulting wage and pension arrears.
35 
                                                 
33 If, as suggested above, tighter restrictions of cash and convertibility are interpreted as the length of time 
money must be held to finance consumption and secure conversion, it is intuitive that in response to 
tightening cash limits, consumers will hold more cash and less deposits. 
34 This ratio has increased from 34 to 46 percent between 2002 and 2005. 
35 A complete liberalization of cash restrictions may initially lead to an increase in cash holdings as agents 
continue  to  accumulate  precautionary  cash  balances  (while  unsure  about  the  duration  of  the  CBU’s  
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On curbing illegal activity, instead of relying on administrative measures, such as 
restricting cash in circulation (which are likely to be counterproductive), the authorities 
should focus on addressing the incentives for participation in the shadow economy. The 
requirement for retail establishments to deposit all cash proceeds on a daily basis should 
be abolished as one of the first steps toward removing tax collection responsibilities 
from banks. 
With regard to the elimination of cash and non-cash distinctions, to the extent 
that the purpose of these restrictions is to prevent money laundering, the authorities 
should  follow  the  practice  of  other  countries  by  replacing  these  restrictions  with  a 
requirement  for  banks  to  report  all  cash  transactions  above  a  certain  size.  This 
distinction  between  cash  and  non-cash  payments  poses  an  unnecessary  burden  for 
businesses and increases the transaction costs of doing business in Uzbekistan. 
The authorities have recently issues decrees aiming to eliminate all forms of cash 
restrictions and to phase out the elimination of the surrender requirements. (The list of 
laws  and  regulations  issued  in  the  past  that  contained  cash  and  foreign  exchange 
restrictions of different nature is reported in Appendix III). If these restrictions were 
credibly  eliminated,  this  could  be  an  important  step  toward  the  development  of  a 
modern  and  competitive  financial  system.  If,  however,  these  and  other  restrictions 
remain in place, or changes are introduced in a less-than-fully-credible manner,
36 the 
financial sector will continue to be marginalized and would have little to offer in the way 
of financial intermediation and growth opportunities for the private sector. 
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Appendix I: Survey Description and Outcomes 
 
Within the framework of the World Bank’s and IMF’s surveillance of economic 
policies in Uzbekistan, a population survey was conducted in summer 2005 to better 
assess the extent and implications of financial sector distortions in Uzbekistan. This 
Appendix contains a summary of some relevant survey outcomes. 
Distribution of respondents by city and sector are reported in Table A-1 below: 
 
Table A-1. Distribution of Survey Respondents 
Number of respondents   
Sectors 
 
Percent  Tashkent  Fergana  Bukhara  Karshi 
Employed in the budget sector 
(teachers, doctors, etc.)  30  90  45  45  45 
Employed at state enterprises  20  60  30  30  30 
Employed in the banking sector 
(banks, etc.)  10  30  15  15  15 
Private entrepreneurs  30  90  45  45  45 
Receiving social benefits (pensions, 
allowances, stipends, etc.)  10  30  15  15  15 
TOTAL  100  300  150  150  150 
 
The  survey  was  conducted  through  personal  interviews  using  a  standardized 
questionnaire. Interviews were conducted in the language preferred by the respondent 
(Uzbek or Russian). After completion of the survey, 15 percent of all the interviews 
were checked by the method of second visits and confirming the main parameters of 
the interviewed households. Select answers to survey questions are summarized below.  
 
 
 
Figure A-1: Frequency with which cash can be retrieved from bank accountsregardless of 
the amount  
(percent of respondents with bank account, by city) 
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Figure A-2: The amount of cash that can be retrieved from a bank account when needed 
(percent of respondents with bank accounts, by city)  
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Figure A-3: Percentage of respondents paying premium on non-cash payments 
(percent of total number of respondents, by city) 
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Figure A-4: How many times does it take to exchange dollars for sums during the past 30 
dates (percent of total number of respondents who attempted to exchange dollars during that 
period) 
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Never could exchange the first
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Figure A-5: Average number of people standing in line to in front of exchange bureaus,by 
city.  
 
Edward Gemayel and David  Grigorian, Distortionary Policies in Uzbekistan 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
255 
7.3
10.9
14.4
18.3
Tashkent
Karshi
Fergana
Bukhara
 
 
Figure A-6: Frequency of using different strategies to cope with the difficulty of accessing 
cash sums (percent of the total number of respondents) 
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Figure A-7: Arrears in wages and other payments due to cash unavailability (percent of total 
number of respondents, by city) 
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Figure A-8: Percentage of employed whose salaries are paid into a bank account (by cities) 
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Figure A-9A: Reasons for refusals to exchange dollars into sums (percent of total number of 
respondents who attempted to exchange dollars during that period) 
9
6 5
2 2
1
4
3
16
12
9
17
5
3
Lack of soums Computer down or
power cut
Amount too high Connection at
exchange bureau
with Central Bank
not working
Old or marked US
dollar bills
Run out of
registration forms
Other reasons
Often or always Sometimes
  
 
Edward Gemayel and David  Grigorian, Distortionary Policies in Uzbekistan 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
257 
Figure A-9B:Reasons for refusals to exchange sums into dollars (percent of the number of 
respondents having ever bought dollars, in the four cities on the whole) 
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Figure A-10: Frequency of exchanging U.S. dollars by private entrepreneurs at the black 
market (percent of total number of private entrepreneurs who have exchanged dollars for sums 
during the previous 30 days) 
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Table A-2. Issues of Biggest Concern 
(percent of total number of respondents by sector) 
 
Description of the Issue 
Budget 
sector 
employees 
State 
enterprise 
employees 
Banking 
sector 
employees 
Private 
business 
owners 
Social 
benefit 
recipients  
My wages (pension, stipend, etc.) are being 
paid with delay  46.7  52.7  1.3  11.6  50.7 
I don’t trust the banks and hence need to 
keep much more cash than I want  18.7  17.3  10.7  25.8  16.0 
I cannot retrieve as much cash as I need 
from my bank account  5.3  6.7  26.7  28.9  1.3 
Small size of my wages (pension, stipend, 
etc.) lack of money/savings  10.7  4.0  9.3  4.9  9.3 
I cannot exchange as many sums into 
dollars (or dollars into sums) as I need  2.7  2.7  5.3  7.6  2.7 
Other  6.7  6.0  5.3  8.9  4.0 
Difficult to answer  9.3  10.7  41.3  12.4  16.0  
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Appendix II - Derivations of the Model 
This Appendix finalizes the derivation of the model outlined in Section X above. 
We would begin here by the steady-state relationships of key indicators.  
In a steady–state, 0 =
·
l and  0 =
·
q resulting in (12) and (13) transforming into 
 
) ( )
1
(
' k f × = + q
b
r l              (A-14) 
 
and 
 
l rbq = .                (A-15)  
 
After substituting (15) into (14): 
) 1 ( ) (
' rb r + = k f .              (A-16) 
 
It follows from (A-15) and (11) that r = r , which suggests that in an 
equilibrium, the real interest rate will be equal to the intertemporal rate of discount. As 
expected, from (A-16), because 0 ) (
' ' < k f , the optimal capital stock, 
* k , will be a 
decreasing function of convertibility restrictions,b . Thus, the steady-state capital stock, 
as well as the output, would increase if convertibility requirements are relaxed.   
To determine the impact of cash and convertibility restrictions on consumption 
of  domestic  and  foreign  goods,  we  solve  the  model  for  the  steady-state  values  of 
hand g . Substituting (A-15) into (9) yields: 
 
) 1 ( ap ar q + + = h u               (A-17) 
 
while substituting it into (10) yields: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ap br ar q q ap rq b a + + + = + + + = e e e ug     (A-18) 
 
) 1 (
) 1 (
ap br ar
ap ar
+ + +
+ +
=
e u
u
g
h .             (A-19) 
 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form 
s s g h g h u = ) , ( (with 1 < s ) yields a simplified relationship between domestic and 
imported consumption goods: 
 
eg h ×
+ +
+ + +
=
) 1 (
) 1 (
ap ar
br ap ar
            (A-20) 
 
For the steady-state (i.e., when  0 =
·
k and  0 =
·
a ), (7) and (8) transform into: 
 
* * * * * + + + + = d k eg h a ) ( b a a           (A-21) 
 
and 
 
 
* * * * - + + = rd eg h k f ) )( 1 ( ) ( ap .          (A-22) 
  
 
Edward Gemayel and David  Grigorian, Distortionary Policies in Uzbekistan 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
259 
From (4) and (6) it follows that: 
 
m d eg h = + +
* * * ) ( a .            (A-23) 
 
From (A-21) and (A-24), it follows that: 
 
  m k eg a + + =
* * * b               (A-24) 
 
while from (A-21) and (A-22) it follows that: 
 
  ) ) ( 1 ( 2 ) ( ap b a + + + = + -
* * * r eg ra rk k f .      (A-25) 
 
Substituting (A-24) into (A-25) yields the expression for the equilibrium level of 
imported consumption goods: 
 
 
r r
m k f
eg
b ap b a - + + +
+
=
*
*
) ) ( 1 ( 2
) (
          (A-26) 
 
Consequently,  the  consumption  of  domestically  produced  goods  could  be 
obtained by using (A-26) and (A-20): 
 
 
) 1 (
) 1 (
) ) ( 1 ( 2
) (
ap ar
br ap ar
b ap b a + +
+ + +
- + + +
+
=
*
*
r r
m k f
h      (A-27) 
 
The only remaining endogenous variable, bank deposits, could then be obtained 
from (A-23), (A-26) and (A-27) as follows: 
 
   
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 


+ +
+ + +
+
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We can now evaluate the following derivatives, which describe the changes in 
economic behavior in response to cash and convertibility restrictions in the model: 
 
a ¶
¶
* h
; 
b ¶
¶
* h
; 
a ¶
¶
*) (eg
; 
b ¶
¶
*) (eg
; 
a ¶
¶
* d
; and 
b ¶
¶
* d
. 
 
While it is relatively easy to see that the impact of both restrictions on imported 
consumption goods is negative, that is: 
 
0
) (
<
¶
¶
*
a
eg
; and  0
) (
<
¶
¶
*
b
eg
           (A-29) 
 
the derivatives of steady-state consumption of domestic goods with respect to 
tightness of cash and convertibility constraints can be shown to have the following 
signs:  
 
  0 <
¶
¶
*
a
h
, while  0 ><
¶
¶
*
b
h
.            (A-30)  
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It follows from the first inequality that the impact of cash restrictions have a 
dampening  effect  on  domestic  consumption.  However,  the  impact  of  convertibility 
constraints  is  ambiguous.  While  the  restrictions  on  convertibility  (and  therefore  on 
imports  of  foreign  goods)  will  have  the  direct  impact  of  encouraging  domestic 
consumption  (since  domestic  and  foreign  goods  are  substitutes),  the  indirect  effect 
through production will have the opposite effect on domestic consumption. The net 
effect will depend on the parameters of the production function and the degree of 
substitutability between domestic and imported consumption.    
 Regarding  the  impact  of  restrictions  on  bank  deposits,  the  results  are  quite 
intuitive as well: 
 
0 <
¶
¶
*
a
d
 and  0 >
¶
¶
*
b
d
            (A-31) 
 
It  appears  that  the  convertibility  restrictions  encourage  deposit  accumulation 
(since fewer dollars are available to finance imports), while limits on cash will reduce the 
amount of deposits. This outcome is a result of the consumers being forced to hold 
more cash (and less money in deposits) in response to tightening requirements.
37 It is 
interesting to see that the outcome of cash restrictions is the opposite of policymakers’ 
intentions, that is to limit cash in circulation and boost deposit accumulation. 
The analysis also sheds light on the welfare implications of observed financial 
sector distortions. It appears that cash shortages have an unambiguous negative impact 
on consumers’ utility through the reduction of both components of consumption. The 
convertibility limits also have a welfare reducing impact. While it is not clear whether 
the  aggregate  consumption, 
* * + eg h ,  is  reduced  as  a  result  of  tightening  of 
convertibility limits, contrasting the second inequality in (A-31) with (A-23) suggests 
that - given a level of money supply - aggregate consumption moves counter-cyclically 
with deposits, in response to changes inb . Therefore, given that 0 >
¶
¶
*
b
d
, it follows 
that 0
) (
<
¶
+ ¶
* *
b
eg h
,  which  implies  a  welfare-reducing  impact  of  convertibility 
restrictions.
38 Thus, while it is possible for domestic consumption to increase as a result 
of  tighter  convertibility  limits,  the  overall  welfare  is  reduced,  because  of  a 
disproportionately greater fall in the consumption of imported goods. Needless to say, if 
                                                 
37 As suggested earlier, it is convenient to think of coefficients a andb as the length of time money must 
be held to finance consumption and secure conversion. It is, therefore, intuitive to note that in response 
to tightening cash limits, (i.e., more days to finance consumption), consumers are likely to held more cash, 
and less deposits. 
38 It could be shown that for all  eg h ³ (i.e., the value of domestically consumed goods is at least as large 
as  that  of  imported  goods,  both  measured  in  domestic  currency),  0
) (
<
¶
+ ¶
b
eg h
  also  implies 
that 0
) (
<
¶
× ¶
b
s g h
, which is a more precise indicator of the welfare-reducing impact of convertibility 
restrictions, given the utility function assumed in the paper.  
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domestic  and  foreign  goods  are  not  perfect  substitutes,  the  welfare  loss  from  the 
reduction in imported consumption will be greater.   
Despite  the  dampening  impact  of  both  types  of  restrictions  on  imports,  they  have 
different impacts on the current account. Since there is no (direct) impact from cash 
restrictions to output (and, therefore, exports) in the model, the impact on the current 
account would be through the impact on imports. The limits on convertibility, however, 
have an impact on aggregate production and exports, in addition to reducing imports, 
and therefore, have an ambiguous impact on the current account.  
 
Appendix  III:  Current  Restrictions  on  Cash  Withdrawal  Abolished  in 
October 2005 
The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (CoM) No. 280 of August 5, 
2002  “On  Measures  to  Further  Reduce  Non-bank  Money  Turnover”  (paragraph  3) 
stated that all economic entities—regardless of form of ownership—are granted the 
right to obtain cash from their bank accounts only up to the amount of cash earnings 
they have turned over. This Resolution also granted discretion to the CBU and the 
commercial banks to interfere with cash withdrawals. 
CoM  resolution  No.  195  of  May  19,  2000  “On  Additional  Measures  to 
Promote Commercial Banks Participation in SME Development” (paragraph 1 and 3) 
and  CoM  resolution  No.  390  of  November  13,  2002  “On  Measures  to  Stimulate 
Saturation of Market  by Consumer Goods” stated that agro-processing enterprises as 
well as agricultural procurement organizations are allowed to withdraw cash only for 
their procurement needs. 
CoM resolution No.29 of February 3, 1995 “On Streamlining of the Use of 
Cash Proceeds”  (paragraph. 1) set limits on spending of proceeds in cash for urgent 
needs by types of entrepreneur activities: retail trade enterprises (up to 5 percent of total 
monthly turnover); catering enterprises (up to 4 percent of total monthly turnover); etc. 
CoM resolution No.542  of December 31, 1998 “On Streamlining of System 
of Selling Oil Products, Liquid and Compressed Gas, Strengthening of Control over 
their Use” (paragraph 4) paved the way for legal entities to be allowed to withdraw cash 
for oil and gas purchases along with travel allowances for long-distance travel. 
CoM resolution No.313 of June 24, 1999 “On Measures to Develop Non-
government  Kindergartens”  (paragraph  5)  stipulated  that  non-government 
kindergartens are allowed to spend only up to 15 percent of their derive revenues to 
purchase food in cash from agricultural markets and retail shops.  
CoM  resolution  No.  172  of  April  12,  2001  “On  Measure  to  Secure  the 
Development of Tanning Industry” (paragraph 4) stated that enterprises included in the 
tanning industry association are allowed to withdraw cash only up to 10 percent of their 
turnover to purchase accessory materials made by individual entrepreneurs. 
CoM resolution No. 483 of October 23, 1997 “On Streamlining of Tax and 
Fee Levying from Physical Entities Involved in Entrepreneur Activities”  (paragraph 1) 
instituted that individual entrepreneurs engaged in trade have the right to withdraw cash 
from their accounts only up to the amount of cash earnings they have turned over. 
  